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N NI IP PE E 1 Introduction
One of the most important structural economic reforms taking place during the last three decades is the privatisation of state-owned enterprises in a wide range of industries all over the world. In the present paper we introduce a new methodological approach to study empirically the dynamics and evolution of the corporate restructuring process due to privatisation, using a multidimensional measure of the type and extent of restructuring, where we link product and labour market variables.
There is now a voluminous empirical literature evaluating the effects of various privatisation reforms. This literature can broadly be classified into two different categories.
First, there is a huge body of literature studying the effects of privatisation on various measures of performance, firm-specific or economy-wide. Then, there is a much smaller but rapidly growing body of literature on the effects of privatisation on labour market outcomes, foremostly wages and employment.
The main bulk of the literature in the former category is summarised in four relatively recent surveys. Megginson and Netter (2001) provide an extensive review of privatisation effects worldwide, but focussing mainly on Western European (non-transition) countries, while Megginson and Sutter (2006) survey empirical studies of privatisation effects in developing countries. On the other hand, Djankov and Murrell (2002) and Estrin et al. (2009) concentrate on privatisation effects in (post-communist) transition economies and China. Although the results vary considerably across countries and industries, and according to different characteristics of the privatisation process, it is a widespread finding that privatisation leads to improved performance, measured either by firm-specific indicators like profits, productivity or value added, or by economy-wide indicators like economic growth or total factor productivity.
Apart from the effect of privatisation on the total employment level of the firm, which is sometimes used as an extra indicator of firm performance, the studies reviewed in the above-mentioned surveys are largely silent on the effect of privatisation on labour market outcomes. In the smaller (but growing) literature focussing on labour market effects of privatisation, the most commonly studied causal relationship is that between privatisation and wages. Although results are not unanimous, the broad picture painted from these studies is that privatisation generally leads to higher wages for workers in the privatised firms. This finding is reported by Bishop and Kay (1988) and Parker and Martin (1996) for UK data, La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) for Mexican data, Brainerd (2002) for Russian data, Ho et al. (2002) for Chinese data, Brown et al. (2006) for Ukrainian data and for Portuguese data. 1 On the other hand, employment effects tend to be more ambiguous and are often found to be negligible (Brown et al., 2010) or negative (Haskel and Szymanski, 1993; La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999 ). 2 One possible explanation for these observed labour market effects is that privatisation tends to increase labour productivity, which is also consistent with the often found result that privatisation enhances performance.
Studies that try to relate both product and labour market effects of privatisation are scarce, as most of the empirical literature on privatisation effects of firm performance builds on data obtained at firm level from company records. This type of data is usually very crude in terms of labour outcomes. On the other hand, studies that look at effects of ownership changes on wages -using data at individual level -usually have little or no information at firm level. 3 Thus, most privatisation studies are partial in the sense that they focus on a limited number of variables, related to either the product or the labour market. However, the corporate restructuring that takes place as a result of a transfer of ownership, from public to private, is arguably a highly dynamic, multi-dimensional and complex process. Motivated by this premise, our study departs from the existing empirical 1 A decomposition of wage effects can often reveal more ambiguous results. For example, Brown et al. (2006) find that wages drop in privatised firms that are worker-controlled, while Monteiro (2010) find short-term wage losses for workers in privatised firms (that are more than compensated for by the long-term wage gains).
2 There are also several studies focussing on the effect of privatisation on other labour market outcomes (besides average wages and total employment), such as wage discrimination (Liu et al., 2000; Peoples and Talley, 2001) , wage inequality (Brainerd, 1998; Ho et al., 2002) , returns to seniority or experience (Munich et al., 2005) and labour force composition (Chong and Leon, 2009 ).
3 A related strand of the literature that relates product and labour markets is the literature on rent sharing between firm owners and their workers. However, this literature is largely silent on the effect of different types of firm ownership. A recent exception is Monteiro et al. (2010) who find that private firm ownership is associated with a higher level of rent sharing. First, we do not confine our analysis of the effects of privatisation to separate analyses with multiple measures of firm performance or labour market outcomes. Instead, we build a multidimensional measure of restructuring that simultaneously takes into account various aspects of both the product and the labour market. More precisely, for each point in time, we define an object that summarizes different aspects (related to labour and product markets) of the privatised firms. Our measure of corporate restructuring is then given by the RV coefficient that measures the distance between two objects defined at two points in time. Thus, compared to previous literature, our multidimensional measure constitutes a more complete summary of the restructuring process. Furthermore, as a separate contribution to the literature, the creation of this multidimensional measure also allows us to trace changes in the composition of privatised firms' workforce, an aspect that has been largely neglected in the privatisation literature.
Second, our methodological approach allows us to take directly into account the dynamics and evolution of the restructuring process following privatisation. The Statis methodology used in the present paper is a three-way exploratory technique based on Principal Components Analysis which includes two methods: the Statis and dual Statis.
Both methods allow us not only to build an object and derive the corresponding RV coefficient, but also to decompose the deviations between two data tables across firms or variables. This means that we are able to assess and compare -at each point in time -the extent of restructuring in each firm and the magnitude of change in each variable measured. This approach is novel to the literature and we believe that it is particularly well suited to study the restructuring process of corporate privatisation. 4 Our approach also contrasts sharply with previous approaches. In particular, we do not aim to establish a causal relationship between privatisation and different measures of firm performance or 4 As noted by Villalonga (2000, p. 51 
"privatization is by definition a change, and needs to be addressed dynamically by looking at a given firm's evolution and transition between its private and public stages within a given firm." labour market outcomes. Instead, we aim to capture the dynamics and understand the evolution and interrelation among the different dimensions of the restructuring process.
Our approach (to be described in detail later) is applied to the privatisation, and subsequent corporate restructuring, in the Portuguese banking industry between 1989 and 1997. We select this industry for different reasons. First, until the mid-1990s, the Portuguese privatisation programme was asymmetric and sectorally biased. Its major incidence -in terms of number of firms or total revenues generated -was in banking.
The privatisation process comprised eleven companies, which accounted for more than 83% of banking employment in 1985 and raised 3,3 billions of euros, which constituted almost half of the total sales of state enterprises in Portugal until the second quarter of 1995. Moreover, in contrast with some other economic sectors, where privatisation is less advanced and still ongoing, privatisation of the entire industry was started and completed between 1989 and 1996. 5 We use aggregate data at firm level provided by Associação Portuguesa de Bancos. This is an unexplored rich data set that, in addition to the standard financial information, contains a number of workforce attributes. In particular, besides information on average wage and total employment at firm level, we know the composition of the workforce in terms of job hierarchy, type of activity and seniority. We also have information on capital formation, profitability and productivity measures that are related to labour market aspects.
Our analysis produces three main findings. First, the restructuring process during the privatisation period is highly heterogeneous with different firms adopting adjustment processes with different speeds and intensities. Second, the variable with the largest contribution to the overall change in the industry is the pay level of workers. Third, we show that the wage increase during the privatisation period is associated with a substantial 5 In addition to the more general privatisation literature mentioned above, there is also a separate recent literature on privatisation in banking. The Journal of Banking and Finance ran a special issue on the topic in 2005 ( Volume 19, , where main lessons from a wide range of countries are summarised by Megginson (2005) and Clarke et al. (2005) . In line with the more general literature, privatisation in banking is generally (but not always) found to improve bank performance, particularly in terms of profitability. Studies of privatisation in banking that incorporates labour market effects are very scarce, an exception being the aforementioned study by . change in the composition, but not the size, of the workforce.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we describe the institutional setting and the data used in our analysis. In Section 3 we give a brief, nontechnical, description of the Statis methodology. The technical details are relegated to the Appendix. We present and discuss our empirical results in Section 4 before closing the paper with a few concluding remarks in Section 5.
Institutional background and data
The privatisation program was introduced in the banking sector as a further step in the successful reform of the Portuguese financial system (OECD, 1999) . This reform started in 1983-84 with the introduction of laws that removed entry barriers while the interest rates and credit ceilings were gradually liberalised. Privatisation was only implemented when most of the price regulations were lifted. The first privatisation law was introduced in 1988 and only allowed partial privatisation of public firms, with the state retaining 51 percent of the equity. For this first phase of privatisation, the government selected four profitable firms. In April 1990, the law that regulates privatisation, lei Quadro das Privatizações, was passed allowing full privatisation of enterprises nationalised after 1974.
The privatisation program was assumed to be an important mechanism for modernising, improving the performance and increasing the competitiveness of public economic units.
In addition, it was a stated objective to widen the participation of Portuguese citizens in the ownership of enterprises, particularly among workers and small shareholders. 6 The firms subject to privatisation were first transformed into corporations, with a prior evaluation being made by two independent entities. However, in contrast with the privatisation program in some other sectors (e.g., electricity and telecommunications), the government adopted a hands-off policy in the pre-privatisation period (Naumann, 1995, and Cruz, 1995) , leaving the economic restructuring for future private owners. The selection of firms for the partial privatisation phase was made based on 6 Sousa and Cruz (1995) describe and discuss the economic and financial situation of public enterprises. 6 performance indicators (OECD, 1989) . However, there was no predetermined schedule for subsequent privatisations (OECD, 1991) . Instead, the timetable was largely determined by the economic and political domestic cycles, and by the international context. By 1997, 10 out of 12 public banks became fully private: 2 were privatised in 1991, 3 in 1994, and each of the 5 remaining banks were privatised in 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993 and 1996, respectively. 7 Privatisations were mainly implemented by public offer, and in many cases ownership of the privatised banks returned to Portuguese groups who owned the banks prior to the nationalisation wave in 1974. 8 Due to this private-public-private ownership path, privatisation in Portugal is often referred to as reprivatisation.
In the empirical analysis, as we have mentioned before, we use aggregate data at firm level provided by Associação Portuguesa de Bancos. Given the restrictions imposed by the Statis methodology (see Section 3), we ended up with a balanced panel covering 10 privatised banks observed during 9 years (between 1989 and 1997), with information on 14 variables that describe both the labour and the product markets of the banking sector. Table 1 
provides summary statistics (means and standard deviations in brackets)
for all variables in the first and last years -1989 and 1997 -and for the entire period. In addition to the wage variable (obtained as the ratio of labour costs and total employment), we also construct 4 product market variables: labour productivity (total sales divided by employment), capital-labour ratio (total assets divided by employment), market share (in terms of sales) and profits per employee (total sales net of worker costs divided by employment). 9 All monetary measures are expressed in 1997 real prices. We use the Consumer Price Index for converting wages per worker and the GDP deflator for the remaining variables (profits, market share and capital intensity). Table 1 shows that privatisation in the Portuguese banking industry brought considerable changes in both labour and product markets. Between 1989 and 1997 banks became smaller. Each bank reduced, on average, by 800 workers, which correspond to an aver-age reduction of 100 workers per year. This downsizing implied substantial changes in the composition of the workforce. Managers and, in particular, workers in technical and specific occupations became relatively more abundant. On the other hand, the share of workers in administrative occupations reduced considerably (about 10 percentage points), although their share in the total workforce is still very large. The restructuring process also led to changes in terms of tenure of the workforce. The share of workers with tenure between 6 and 11 years dropped by 16 percentage points in favour of workers with less or more tenure. In addition, privatisation restructuring meant that banks reinforced the already major share of workers in commercial activities.
These compositional changes of the workforce were accompanied by an extraordinary rise in the average wage which almost tripled between 1989 and 1997. During this period, there was a general increase in the wage level in virtually all economic sectors, corresponding to the fast economic growth in Portugal after its membership in the European Union in 1986. Nevertheless, Monteiro (2009) finds that earnings in banking rose significantly also in relative terms, a result that is robust to the use of different control groups. Thus, this rise in wages reflects particularly the effects of the reforms (liberalisation and privatisation) in the banking sector which led to considerable improvements in terms of the performance of banks. For instance, the OECD (1999) survey reports a continuous increase in the productivity level (implying a reduction in operating/staff costs from 1.53 percent of average assets in 1991 to 0.98 percent in 1997) and also a remarkable improvement in the profitability rate (return to equity) after 1995. This global improvement in the efficiency level of the industry is also confirmed by Pinho (1999) , who finds that the performance improvements are more pronounced among the privatised banks. Even though the privatised banks did not increase, on average, their market shares, the figures in Table 1 clearly show that labour productivity, capital per worker and profitability increased remarkably between 1989 and 1997, with average annual growth rates ranging from 12% to 28%. 
Results
We use the Statis methodology to explore two different issues regarding the restructuring process of the banking sector. The first issue is to identify a pattern of total changesacross years and across individual banks. Juxtaposing this information with bank-specific privatisation dates enables us to say something about the timing, speed and extent of the restructuring process. We will refer to this as the dynamics of restructuring. The second issue is to decompose the total changes observed and identify which variables made the largest contributions to the restructuring process. We will refer to this as the content of restructuring.
Dynamics of restructuring
We start by identifying the points in time (i.e., years) in which the banks restructure more (less). For this purpose, we compute the matrix of RV coefficients, which allows to measure the level of similarity (or the global association) between two data matrices. 10 In our setting, the RV coefficient measures the level of similarity, and thus distance, between two objects that summarise the structure of banks in any two points in time. The RV coefficient varies between 0 and 1, where a higher value means a higher closeness between the two objects being compared. The magnitude of the RV coefficient depends on the number of individuals (banks), on the number of variables and on the dimensionality (the covariance structure) of each data set (Josse et al., 2008) . Since the individuals and the variables are constant throughout our analysis, this means that changes in the RV coefficient can be attributed exclusively to changes in the dimensionality of the data set. Thus, we can interpret a higher (lower) RV coefficient as a lower (higher) level of restructuring having taken place.
In terms of computation, due to the enormous difference in the magnitude of variables from Table 1 , the RV coefficients shown in Table 2 are obtained after normalising the referred variables. Regarding the variables that characterise the employment structure (in terms of occupation, main activity and seniority) and which together sum to one, we follow the econometrics tradition of selecting only two variables describing the occupational and seniority categories and one variable describing the main activity of workers. 11 In the end we use 11 variables: 7 labour and 4 product market variables. 12
The RV coefficient compares globally the structure of banks between the years defined by the first row and column. For instance, focussing on the first column, we observe that the RV coefficient is gradually reduced (except for 1994), implying that, compared to 1989, banks become more dissimilar, and thus restructure more, over time. In terms of dynamics, we focus on the figures immediately below the diagonal, which compare the level of similarity/restructuring between each year and the preceding year. Table 2 shows that the RV coefficient is high in any pair of consecutive years. This suggests a continuous adjustment to the privatisation reform. Nevertheless, we can identify two 'peaks' in the restructuring process. The largest differences in the RV coefficients, compared to preceding years, are observed in 1993 and 1995. Interestingly, this is consistent with the aforementioned findings reported by OECD (1999), referring to the year 1995 as a turning point in the performance of the banking sector. In contrast, in 1991 and 1996 we observe the strongest similarities between two pairs of consecutive years. Therefore, the graphical representation of the centered interstructure (Figure 1) , where the axes of plane 1-2 explain 71.4% of the total variance, allows us to identify three distinct periods of the restructuring process. 13 The three periods are 1989-1992, 1993-1994 and 1995-1997, and they are identified by the fact that total changes across banks are larger between than step is to transform them into square matrices. The exact transformation is described in the Appendix.
11 Results do not qualitatively depend on the exclusion or inclusion of these three variables. 12 We classify variables that include information about sales as product market variables (e.g., labour productivity).
13 Figure 1 is a two-dimensional representation of the degree of (dis)similarity across years, where a larger distance between two points (years) indicate a stronger dissimilarity between these two years. within these periods. Are these changes directly related with the privatisation reform? Are banks homogeneous in terms of speed of restructuring? Do banks mainly adjust before or after the reform? Is the adjustment immediately after (before) the reform or is it delayed for some time after privatisation? In order to answer these questions, we proceed by identifying how much of the total changes can be explained by each bank, and relate these individual contributions to the respective privatisation dates. The decomposition of the squared distances across the banks allows us to identify which banks experienced the largest changes and at which points in time. Table 3 indicates for each bank the year of privatisation (column 1) and the respective contribution to the total variation between two consecutive years (columns 2 to 9) or between the most diverging years 1989 and 1997 (column 10).
Column 11 shows the contribution of each bank to the total variation considering all years.
Naturally, all columns sum to 100%. In order to facilitate the reading of the table, we highlight in bold the largest contributions of each bank, provided that the contributions 13 are larger than 10 percent. 14 We then interpret the contribution of each bank considering the global size of the RV coefficient (from Table 2 ) and the date of privatisation. worker, labour productivity and share of workers in technical occupations while negatively correlated with the variable share of workers in commercial activities. 16 The second axis is positively correlated the variables bank employment, market share and labour productivity. 17 Finally, the third axis is positively correlated with labour productivity and negatively correlated with the share of workers in managerial occupations. 18 The banks that exhibit a larger trajectory or movement across both axes in the two planes correspond to the banks that restructured more. A narrower trajectory shows a lower level of adjustment. 15 We show the trajectory of each bank in three planes in order to maximise the share of total variance explained. The first two axes explain 68.4% of the total variance, while 78.5% is explained by the addition of the third axis. 16 A bank like BFN, that has high profits and labour productivity and a high share of technical workers appears on the positive side of the axis, while banks like BPSM and BBI, that have a large share of workers in commercial activities appear on the negative side of the first axis.
17 Banks like BPA, BES and BPSM, that are recorded with high values of these three variables appear on the positive side of the second axis.
18 Banks with high (low) figures on labour productivity and low (high) figures on the share of workers in managerial occupations, such as BPSM and BCA (BTA and BFB), appear on the positive (negative) side of the third axis. 
Content of restructuring
A further decomposition of the restructuring process allows us to explore which variables contribute more to the overall magnitude of restructuring. Table 4 replicates Table 3 by decomposing the squared distances between the correlation matrices across years according to the variables used in the study. For clarity of exposition, we include in bold figures variables whose contribution to the overall changes is above 9%, which corresponds approximately to the division of 100% by 11 variables.
Considering all years (column 11), the variables that explain most of the restructuring are wage per worker, share of workers with tenure between 6 and 11, capital labour ratio and workers in managerial occupations. Notice that this type of information cannot be reached by inspecting the usual summary statistics shown in Table 1 . The pay level in the banking industry is by far the variable that changed the most, with a contribution of 17.7% of the total variation. Interestingly, this variation reflects mainly substantial changes in the quality, and not quantity, of the workforce, either in terms of seniority or occupational category. In particular, the correlation matrices 19 across years show that in the period 1993-1994, higher wages are associated with a larger share of workers with tenure below 6 years, a larger share of workers in technical occupations and a lower share of workers in commercial activities, while in the subsequent period 1995-1997, higher wages are associated with a larger share of workers with tenure below 6 years, a lower share of workers in managerial occupations and a lower share of workers in commercial activities. The magnitude of pay level changes might also to reflect gains in terms of labour productivity, profits and capital per worker, in particular after 1992. In fact, the correlations between wages, profits, labour productivity and capital per worker become substantially stronger and positive over the period 1993-1997. This finding suggest that wages might be responding to the increased profitability of the banks, possibly explained
19 Not shown in the paper but available upon request.
by more rent sharing in privatised banks. This result is consistent with findings of Monteiro et al. (2010) for the whole Portuguese economy. Table 4 also suggests that the initial phase of the banks' restructuring process consisted mainly of changes in the workforce composition and investment in capital equipment.
These changes led after 1994 to important changes in product market variables -profits, In accordance with Table 4 , the variables wage per worker, managerial occupation, tenure between 6 and 11 years and capital labor ratio exhibit ample trajectories across one or both axes, implying sizeable changes in the variables over time.
Concluding remarks
This paper examines the restructuring process of 10 privatised banks during a 9-year period, using the Statis and the dual Statis approach. Our empirical findings pinpoint some important lessons. First, the analysis of privatisation effects using data aggregated at industry level can potentially be a dangerous exercise as it might obscure diverse adjustment processes occurring at individual firm level. Furthermore, apart from identifying wages as the most important variable in the restructuring process, our results also indicate significant skill compositional effects of privatisation, a dimension almost absent in the literature concerning the labour market effects of privatisation. Finally, we also provide empirical evidence suggesting that privatisation is associated with a higher level of rent sharing, a topic that deserves further research.
Appendix: Statis and dual Statis
Let (X k ) n×p k , k = 1, . . . , K, be the data table associated with the kth point in time or circumstance, where n refers to the total number of individuals and p k is the number of variables in the kth data table.
The Statis method: Let Q k be the metric in the individuals space (in general defined by the identity matrix or by a diagonal matrix whose main elements are the reciprocal of the variance of variables) which enables us to determine the distance between two individuals and let D be the metric in the variables space (in general defined by a diagonal matrix whose elements are the weights associated to the individuals) which
The second axis is explained mainly (81% ) by the variables market share, bank employment, workers in managerial occupations and capital labour ratio. The variables share of workers with tenure between 6 and 11, share of workers in managerial occupations and capital labour ratio explain 76% of the third axis.
enables us to determine the correlation between two variables. In the interstructure step we associate to each X k a matrix W k of the scalar products between individuals, the object representative of each data table, given by
denotes the transpose matrix of X k . The distance between objects at stages k and k is given by the scalar product of Hilbert-Schmidt,
where T r denotes the trace operator of a matrix, being W k = W k , W k HS . The vectorial correlation coefficient RV proposed by Robert and Escoufier (1976) is equivalent to the scalar product of Hilbert-Schmidt between normed objects and is defined by Notice that if the weights π k are equal, it is enough to base the PCA on the matrix S.
For obtaining a centered euclidean image of the data tables, we base the PCA on the matrix ∼ S = I K − 11 T ∆ S I K − ∆11 T , where I K is the identity matrix of order K and 1 is a vector of dimension K with all components equal to 1. In the intrastructure step, the compromise is the object W , defined by the weighted mean W = table is defined by either the covariance or correlation matrix (in case of standardized data), given
The scalar product of Hilbert-Schmidt between two objects at stages k and k is defined by V k , V k HS = T r (QV k QV k ) . The diagonalization of the matrix Z∆,
where Z denotes the matrix of the scalar products between the objects, allows us to obtain the euclidean image of the series of data tables. The compromise is the object given by V = K k=1 β k V k . The diagonalization of the matrix V Q enables us to obtain the euclidean image of the compromise. Finally, we decompose the squared distances between two pair of objects into percentages of variables' contributions, i.e., we calculate the quantities C var i,d 2
, where C var i,d 2
HS
represents the contribution of the ith variable to the squared distance d 2 HS , q ii denotes the ith diagonal element of the matrix Q and V ij k denotes the ij-element of the matrix V k . We also represent the variables' trajectories on the compromise euclidean image.
